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Abstract 
Right-wing populism has experienced a surge in popularity among advanced democracies 
around the world. The success of right-wing populism has changed the course of history for the 
United Kingdom, which will become the first state to ever leave the European Union due to the 
success of Brexit. Recent research has identified several potential grievances that have 
motivated support for right-wing populism. The first theory points to the economic grievances 
that result from the economic displacement that accompanies modernization. The second theory 
emphasizes cultural grievances, with those that feel their traditional values have been 
challenged and displaced taking part in a “cultural backlash.” The declinism theory states that 
populism is a result of people viewing society as declining, whether that be socially, culturally, 
or economically. The fourth and final theory states that those who lack social recognition and 
respect are the most likely to feel “left behind” and support right-wing populism. This analysis 
will focus on the “left behind” theory which accounts for educational and class differences that 
past theories have not been able to explain. We hypothesize that those who feel they are no 
longer respected or recognized in society are the most likely to support Brexit. Using an OLS 
regression, we find that those who perceive themselves to be part of a lower social class, feel 
they are not recognized by mainstream society, and maintain anti-immigration attitudes will 
have higher levels of support for Brexit.  
 
Introduction 
 The electoral prevalence and persistence of right-wing populism in advanced 
democracies has reached an unprecedented level over the past two decades (Inglehart & Norris 
2016). The longevity and success of populism is a byproduct of social modernization, where 
developed democracies have experienced significant technological and societal change (Arwine 
& Mayer 2013). These changes have led to a more informed electorate that is increasingly 
skeptical of the established political systems and politicians. Increased skepticism and mistrust of 
the establishment, coupled with new grievances generated by the economic transformations of 
globalization and post-industrialization, has left traditional mainstream parties unable and 
unwilling to satisfy the demands of citizens. Citizens’ support has instead shifted towards anti-
establishment, populist parties and movements that recognize these new grievances.  
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Populist parties have entered legislatures throughout Europe often due to proportional 
electoral rules that provide opportunities for small, new challenger parties to gain seats amidst 
larger and more centrist parties. The Netherlands’ populist radical right party, the Party for 
Freedom, only received 13% of the national vote but won 20 seats and became the second largest 
party in the Dutch House of Representatives (The Economist 2017). It was once considered 
standard wisdom that majoritarian electoral rules were a safeguard against PRR parties gaining 
power. This wisdom aligned with Duverger’s Law, which stipulates that first-past-the-post 
electoral rules produce party systems with two broad and ideologically centrist catch-all parties. 
Under these conditions, it is very difficult for a new party to form and gain enough support to 
experience electoral success, even in countries that have simultaneously generated grievances 
among a significant proportion of the electorate due to economic and cultural modernization 
(Norris 2005). As it turns out, however, right-wing populism and identity politics are not 
prevented in majoritarian systems, they are simply forced to take a different route to enter and 
influence the system. On June 23, 2016, citizens of the United Kingdom voted to end their 
membership in the European Union by a vote of 51.9% to 48.1% (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley 
2016). Less than five months later on November 8, 2016, Americans elected Donald Trump to be 
the 45th President of the United States with 57% of the electoral college. Both of these votes 
made it clear that majoritarian systems are not immune to populism. 
The electoral success of right-wing populism has led to a more divisive political climate, 
as citizens within majoritarian systems can typically be labeled one of two things: a supporter of 
the right-wing populist candidate/referendum, or not. Labels that have been attached to populist 
leaders and politicians, such as racist, xenophobic, homophobic, or sexist, have also been applied 
to their supporters. These broad, sweeping descriptions have done little to actually account for 
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the multi-faceted attitudes of the tens of millions of voters in each country that have supported 
right-wing populism. 
The rise of right-wing populism in majoritarian systems indicates there is a significant 
segment of society that feels voiceless and angry as a result of the current political establishment. 
Populism is indicative of a deeper, more polarizing divide in society with little common ground 
between the two opposing parties. If these grievances are not addressed or recognized, Brexit and 
other forms of populism may only be the beginning of backlash movements (Goodhart 2017). 
The great divide among citizens should serve as warning to policy makers that there is something 
badly out-of-balance in our representative democracies and that a large segment of society is 
feeling “left behind.” These grievances signal that politicians and policy makers alike must do 
more to address problems of social integration and address the ways in which citizens feel their 
demands are not being met. Support for right-wing populism is a force that cuts across age, 
income, education, and even political parties (Goodhart 2017). Understanding what drives 
populist support across a wide range of people is imperative to understanding how to strengthen 
liberal democracy and representative institutions. 
At the broadest level, this paper will analyze the drivers of support for right-wing 
populism by looking at the unlikely case of success in a majoritarian electoral context: the vote 
for Brexit in Britain. Can support be attributed to those that are classified as the “losers of 
modernization”? Is support linked to a “cultural backlash” against the progressive values that 
emerged in the 1970s to directly challenge traditional values and hierarchies among elites across 
developed democracies? Or, can support be better explained by a failure of social integration in 
affluent Western societies that causes a growing number of citizens to feel that they are “left 
behind”?  
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Populism: A Movement of Different Crises 
The definition of populism over time has narrowed and widened in specificity. Despite 
the numerous variations, the most prominent definition treats populism as a thin-centered 
ideology with a clearly articulated, but narrow core (Mudde 2004). The two fundamental features 
of this restricted core are (1) the superior and moral status of “the people” over the identified 
“other” and (2) that politics should be a direct expression of the will of ordinary citizens (Mudde 
2004). Populism is thin and vague in general, allowing for versatility in expression from state to 
state (Betz 1998). Inherent in this versatility is the country-specific definition of “the people” and 
the “Other,” although the easiest way to identify who “the people” are is to identify who the 
“Others” are first (Mudde 2007). There is a Manichean distinction between the two groups, with 
the “Others,” and the elites who protect and promote them, being seen as the evil enemy (Mudde 
2007). “The people” are described, in direct opposition to the outgroup, as moralistic, good, and 
endowed with common sense (Mudde 2004; Mudde 2007). Though the thin ideology of 
populism may attach itself with ideologies of the right or left, for the purposes of this research, 
populism will be discussed only in terms of right-wing populism, the variance that has received 
the most attention in the literature.   
The rise of right-wing populism is identified by Kriesi as “movements of crisis” that are 
related with societal displacement (Betz 1998). Populist movements therefore, are thought to be 
found when a society is experiencing significant change that disrupts traditional structures, 
whether they be cultural, social, or economic. Over the past two decades, there has been renewed 
interest in explaining the rise of right-wing populism throughout advanced democracies. One 
explanatory variable that research has examined has been on the “supply-side,” which 
emphasizes the role of the parties within the political marketplace (Norris 2005). This approach 
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focuses on the actions of the party, party leaders, analyzing party platforms, rhetoric used, and 
chosen placement on the ideological spectrum (Norris 2005). The opposing approach looks at 
public demand for political parties, emphasizing the development of specific grievances within 
society that precipitate the demand for populist right-wing parties (Norris 2005). Although the 
Leave campaign undoubtedly played some role in motivating support for Brexit on the supply 
side, the current research is interested only in the demand side. Specifically, what grievances 
motivated voters to support the Brexit referendum.  
 Populism has often been attributed to the psychological crises that result from 
modernization and de-industrialization. Commonly known as the “losers of modernization” 
thesis, Betz 1998 asserts that the societal changes that accompanied modernization have made 
blue-collar workers and employees doing routine work feel insecure, afraid, anxious, and 
uncertain of the future due to societal and economic displacement. Populist parties address these 
latent fears and economic insecurities, allowing those that feel displaced by modernization to feel 
protected by populist parties and leaders (Betz 1998; Golder 2016). This psychological crisis is 
most likely to be found in those that were affected by the economic shift from an industrial-based 
to service-based economy, primarily the less educated and those that were in the traditional 
“popular classes” (Betz 1998). Empirical results, however, have produced mixed results 
(Inglehart & Norris 2016). This hypothesis does not account for right-wing populist support 
beyond the social groups that were displaced by modernization and de-industrialization 
(Inglehart & Norris 2016). 
 An alternate hypothesis suggests that support for right-wing populism is a result of the 
cultural crises in advanced democracies due to traditional values being challenged and 
supplanted by secular, progressive values (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart & Welzel 
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2005; Inglehart & Norris 2016). The cultural backlash thesis goes beyond economic 
displacement to suggest that support can be seen as a reaction to the cultural value change that 
has accompanied modernization (Inglehart & Norris 2016). Elderly people, white men, and those 
that are less educated are expected to react most negatively to this cultural change and seek 
recognition and protection among populist right-wing parties and movements (Inglehart & Norris 
2016). This thesis correctly acknowledges the shift in research that emphasizes values and 
attitudes as better predictors of populist right-wing support rather than an individual’s social and 
economic group characteristics (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove 2014; Gidron & Hall 2017; 
Inglehart & Norris 2016). But the cultural backlash hypothesis fails to properly explain why 
those that are highly educated still support right-wing populist parties and additionally, why 
cultural backlash is just now taking place, considering progressive values developed in the late 
1960s (Bartels 2017; Gidron & Hall 2017).  
 A theory that better explains what drives support for right-wing populism relates to a 
general societal crisis. The declinism theory suggests that populist support originates from 
individuals that perceive society as changing in a negative way and have a sense of relative 
deprivation (Elchardus & Spruyt 2014). Support for populism is not dependent on personal 
satisfaction, since perceptions are based on societal decline and not personal circumstances 
(Elchardus & Spruyt 2014). Related to this thesis, Gidron and Hall suggest that support for 
populism is related to a crisis of social integration (2017). Gidron and Hall use level of social 
integration to operationalize feeling “left behind” and go to extensive lengths to show that 
subjective social status (SSS) is a reliable indicator of social integration (2017). This hypothesis 
states that those who feel “left behind,” and therefore not socially integrated, are more likely to 
support populist parties (Gidron & Hall 2017). Individuals that are more concerned with respect 
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and recognition from society, rather than redistribution, are more likely to support right-wing 
populism (Gidron & Hall 2017). 
Little research has been generated on what attitudes influenced support for the EU 
referendum in the United Kingdom. An aggregate-level analysis found that there were 
associations between education level and support for Brexit, with areas that have a higher 
proportion of people with no educational qualifications being more likely to support Brexit 
(Goodwin & Heath 2016). There was also an evident association between age and support for 
Brexit, with areas that have more constituents aged 65 and over being more likely to support 
Brexit. Areas with more people aged 18 to 30 were less likely to support Brexit. Another recent 
study found that economic and immigration benefit-cost calculations had a strong connection in 
influencing voters’ decision to support Brexit although this research does not follow any of the 
theoretical approaches outlined here (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley 2016). Research concerning 
the attitudes among Brexit voters is in its infancy, indicating there is still significant investigation 
needed to understand what attitudes motivated voters to leave the EU.  
The “left behind” theory articulated and tested by Gidron and Hall offers the most 
promising explanation for the motivations of Brexit voters. It may therefore be hypothesized 
that: the lower a person’s social integration, the more likely they will support Brexit.  
Research Design 
The universe of cases for this research includes the core voters for right-wing populism in 
all advanced democracies. In particular, Brexit has been recognized as a signal of populism’s 
undeniable presence in advanced democracies (Goodhart 2017). It is almost universally 
recognized as a case of Eurosceptic right-wing populism, although in this case populism was 
manifested through a referendum and not a legislative election. With Brexit serving as an 
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example of the manifestation of right-wing populism in advanced democracies, the theories 
advanced throughout the literature in relation to attitudes among voters ought to also apply to 
those that voted to leave the EU.  
This paper will investigate the level of social integration among individuals in the United 
Kingdom that voted to leave the European Union. A face-to-face post-election survey completed in 
2015 by the British Election Study (BES) will be used that includes occupation data and vote 
validation. The BES has conducted post-election surveys after every general election since 1964 and 
maintains its status as one of the longest running election studies in the world. The sample drawn 
from the BES 2015 survey includes 2,987 respondents, which is a large sample size that will offer 
results with high confidence levels. Despite the survey taking place a year prior to the EU 
referendum, the questionnaire specifically asks respondents about their intended vote in the 
referendum and whether they approve or disapprove of EU membership. The timing of this survey 
will allow for support for Brexit to be analyzed prior to the Leave campaign. This allows the supply-
side effects to be minimized in our research, emphasizing the demand that was present prior to the 
Leave and Remain campaigns. These will serve as the proxy measures for “leave” and “remain” 
votes in the referendum. Based off of Gidron and Hall’s research, questions that relate to social 
integration will be used. In order to analyze support specifically for right-wing populism, the social 
integration questions will deal with an individual’s perception of recognition and respect from 
society. Based off of the associations found in past research, demographic measurements will be 
incorporated as controls for any influence these factors might have on voting behavior in the EU 
referendum. 
 Using SPSS, a linear regression model will be employed to analyze the relationship between 
support for Brexit and feelings that relate to social integration. Support for Brexit will be the 
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dependent variable with feelings of social integration being the key hypothesis variables. Using a 
linear regression method of analysis is the appropriate statistical modelling technique when 
analyzing a scaled dependent variable. The significance of each variable along with the coefficients 
will create an equation that estimates an individual’s level of support for Brexit. 
Operationalization and Measurement 
 Following the work of Gidron and Hall (2017), economic factors, cultural factors, and the 
interaction between these two factors, all influence feelings of social integration among 
individuals. It is broadly accepted that the societal shift towards higher education has 
economically displaced those that benefitted from an industrial society who are now considered 
low-skilled with low levels of education and therefore, minimal opportunities to change jobs or 
relocate (Gidron & Hall 2017; Goodhart 2017). Those who feel they have been economically 
displaced or that their values have been rejected by society are most likely to have their social 
statuses altered and perceive to receive less respect from society. These feelings of economic 
displacement and societal rejection of values culminate to feeling “left behind” (Gidron & Hall 
2017). Subjective social status is therefore used to operationalize feeling “left behind.” Proxy 
measures used by Gidron and Hall to capture subjective social status include level of social 
contact; degree to which people see themselves as part of a shared normative order; and the level 
of respect or recognition people perceive to be given by mainstream society.  
Due to the limitations of the dataset used in this research, subjective social status will be 
captured through the survey question that asks respondents whether they feel that they belong to 
the working class, middle class, or upper class. According to the work of Gidron and Hall, those 
that are more concerned with respect and recognition from society are more likely to support 
right-wing populism, while those that are more concerned with redistribution are more likely to 
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support left-wing populism. Respect and recognition from society will be captured with a 
question that asks whether respondents agree or disagree with the phrase “politicians don’t care 
what people like me think.” Support for redistribution will be captured by asking whether 
respondents believe the government should (1) cut taxes and spend less on social services or (2) 
increase taxes and spend more on social services. Anti-immigration attitudes will also be 
incorporated as an independent variable to capture those that perceive immigrants and 
immigration negatively. Anti-immigration attitudes will be measured by asking respondents 
whether they think there have been too many immigrants let into the country or not. Additional 
independent variables that will serve as controls include gender, working status, union 
membership, age, income, and education level to control for any differences in demographics 
that may influence an individual’s decision to support Brexit. These controls will allow for the 
significance and strength of attitudinal measures to be accurately identified. For further 
explanation of each independent variable included in the analysis, reference the Appendix. 
For the dependent variable, two questions selected from the BES survey were coded in 
the same direction and combined to create an additive scale. The first question asked respondents 
if they approved of EU membership, while the second question asked whether the respondent 
would vote to leave or remain in the EU if the election were held that day. Support for Brexit is 
therefore measured along a continuum from 0 to 4, with 0 capturing those that fully support EU 
integration and want to remain in the EU and 4 representing those that do not approve of EU 
membership and would vote to leave in the referendum.  
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Analysis & Findings 
Before applying a regression analysis, a bivariate correlation was employed to determine 
if significant correlations exist between the dependent and independent variables as well as 
between different independent variables.   
[Table 1] 
The first clear finding is that all of the independent variables correlate with the dependent 
variable in the direction we would expect besides union membership, those aged 65 and up, and 
the underemployed variable. Consistent with Gidron and Hall’s work, subjective social status 
and social recognition are also significantly and negatively correlated. This finding indicates that 
those who feel they are not recognized or respected are more likely to feel that they are part of a 
lower social class. Anti-immigration sentiments are significantly correlated with subjective 
social status and social recognition, which is what we would expect in the UK context given the 
negative rhetoric surrounding immigration issues. This indicates that those who do not support 
immigration also feel that they are part of a lower social class and do not feel socially respected. 
Additionally, there were a number of variables significantly correlated with the declinism 
variable. There was a significant and positive correlation between subjective social status and 
declinism, indicating that an individual was more likely to believe society had declined if they 
perceived themselves to be in a lower social class. Those that agreed they were not respected 
socially were also more likely to believe society had declined. This demonstrates that feeling as 
though society is in general decline may have a significant but indirect effect in motivating 
support for Brexit. 
Since the dependent variable is measured using an additive scale, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is the appropriate method to use in this analysis. Using OLS, a linear regression is 
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estimated to determine what attitudinal and demographic factors influence support for Brexit. All 
independent variables included in the bivariate correlations were included in the first estimated 
regression. 
[Table 2] 
All of the independent variables behaved in the direction predicted besides gender and working 
status. This indicates first that being a male does not increase support for Brexit and that being 
underemployed or unemployed does not lead to an increase in support for Brexit either. Besides 
these variables not behaving in the expected direction, they were also not significant, which 
further indicates that they are not a reliable measure for determining an individual’s level of 
support for Brexit. The only significant variables identified, in order of significance, were anti-
immigration attitudes, social recognition, and subjective social status. 
An additional linear regression was estimated in order to eliminate all independent 
variables that were not statistically significant in the full model. Thus, the final model only 
includes variables that have a significant relationship with support for Brexit at the .01 or .05 
levels. 
[Table 3] 
Based off of the three statistically significant variables identified, the final estimated equation 
can be represented by: 
Support Brexit=1.850 + 0.521(Ant-immigration=1) + 0.201(Social Recognition) – 0.302(SSS) 
Anti-immigration attitudes are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, which means we can be 
more than 99% confident in its relationship with support for Brexit. Lacking feelings of social 
recognition was statistically significant at the 0.02 level, which means we can be more than 98% 
confident in its relationship with support for Brexit. Subjective social status was statistically 
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significant at the 0.05 level, which means we can be more than 95% confident of its relationship 
with support for Brexit. 
Social recognition, subjective social class, and anti-immigration attitudes were the three 
statistically significant variables in the final estimated regression. The coefficient for anti-
immigration attitudes still behaves in the direction expected, indicating a positive relationship 
with support for Brexit. This positive relationship means that if an individual believes 
immigration policy has been too liberal, their support for Brexit increases by 0.52 points on the 
scale for support for Brexit. The coefficient for social recognition is in the direction predicted, 
demonstrating a positive relationship with voting for Brexit. This means that if an individual 
“strongly agrees” that they are not recognized or respected by society, which is coded as “4,” 
support for Brexit will increase by 0.804 points (0.201*4). Also behaving in the expected 
direction, subjective social status has a negative relationship with support for Brexit. If an 
individual perceives to be part of the middle class, coded as “2,” then support for Brexit 
decreases by 0.604 (-0.302*2).  
The coefficients identified for social recognition and subjective social status support 
hypothesis 1. The coefficient for social recognition indicates that the more an individual believes 
their voice is not heard or recognized, the greater their support for Brexit will be. The coefficient 
for subjective social class indicates that those who perceive themselves to have a higher social 
class are less likely to vote for Brexit. Both of these findings are consistent with the findings of 
Gidron & Hall’s research. The identification of anti-immigration attitudes as statistically 
significant is a valuable finding that was not directly included in the hypothesis. But based off of 
the significant correlations between social recognition and subjective social status, anti-
immigration sentiments seem to play a significant role in feeling socially integrated and valued 
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or respected within society. Understanding the significance of feelings towards immigration in 
the UK can thus expand our understanding of what determines feeling socially integrated in the 
UK. 
 The adjusted R-squared value for this model is 0.106, which indicates that roughly 11% 
of the behavior of the dependent variables can be explained by these three independent variables. 
Although this explanatory value seems low, it is to be expected considering other significant 
variables, such as party identification and support for the UK Independence Party, were not 
included. Therefore, this model can still be considered a reliable source for determining an 
individual’s level of support for Brexit when only examining attitudinal measures.   
 These findings suggest that there is a significant issue of social integration in the United 
Kingdom, with a significant segment of the population feeling “left behind,” and therefore not 
recognized, or socially respected. This indicates that many people feel voiceless and believe they 
that they are not fully valued members of society. One potential reason for not feeling socially 
recognized may be that British citizens feel their demands are overlooked by the EU and political 
establishment in comparison to immigration issues. The same findings are likely applicable to 
the success of Donald Trump in the United States with many Americans not feeling socially 
respected or valued by society. Immigration issues potentially played a significant role in this 
election, too. More broadly, these findings suggest that there is a crisis of social integration 
across Western society that is giving rise to right-wing populism in many different forms. The 
Leave campaign and Brexit vote resonated with many grievances in the UK for the time being, 
but if measures that address social recognition are not undertaken, these grievances may only 
intensify over time.  It is unclear what form these grievances may take if they intensify, but we 
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can only expect them to be more polarizing and more extreme if not addressed within the 
political realm.  
Limitations to this research include not incorporating measures of ethnicity, foreign status, 
controlling for rural and urban regions, controlling for areas such as Scotland and London that 
were heavily “remain” in Brexit, and feelings of English nationalism. These variables were all 
identified as statistically significant in the current research but could not be implemented in this 
analysis due to survey limitations. Further research on Brexit may offer us a more detailed and 
complete explanation about who supported Brexit and the different grievances that motivated 
this support. 
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Table 1: Bivariate correlations among the dependent variable and independent variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Support Brexit -            
2. Subjective class -0.10** -           
3. Social 
Recognition 
0.168*
* 
-.197** -          
4. Support for 
redistribution 
-.079** -.053 0.009 -         
5. Declinism 
(economy) 
-0.028 
0.181*
* 
-
0.304*
* 
-
0.106** 
-        
6. High Income -.131** 
0.253*
* 
-
0.310*
* 
-
0.056** 
0.200** -       
7. Union 
Membership=1 
-0.026 -0.044 -0.044* 0.042* -0.006 0.141** -      
8. Male=1 0.013 0.001 0.015 
-
0.062** 
0.110** 0.118** -0.008 -     
9. Tertiary 
Education=1 
-.194** 
0.283*
* 
-0.22** -0.001 0.098** 
0.354*s
* 
0.150** -0.013 -    
10. Ages 18-30=1 -.140** 
-
0.088*
* 
0.027 
-
0.068** 
-
0.049** 
-0.043* -0.041* -0.016 0.026 -   
11. Ages 65+ =1 -.125** 
0.079*
* 
0.011 0.078** 0.062** -.252** -.150** 0.020 0.174** 
-
0.254** 
-  
12. Underemploye
d 
-.010 0.050 0.012 0.087** 
-
0.088** 
-.267** -.101** -.251** -.096** 0.014 
0.143*
* 
- 
13. Anti-
immigration =1 
0.309*
* 
-0.071* 
0.110*
* 
-
0.078** 
0.016 -0.142** 
-
0.044** 
-0.015 
-
0.281** 
-
0.123** 
0.160*
* 
0.015 
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Table 2: Full model of variables associated with support for Brexit 
 
Dependent Variable: Support for Brexit Unstandardized Coefficients () Standard Error 
Constant 2.176*** 
(0.00) 
0.538 
Anti-immigration=1 0.462*** 
(0.002) 
0.147 
Social Recognition 0.166* 
(0.079) 
0.094 
SSS -0.274* 
(0.072) 
0.152 
Support Redistribution -0.007 
(0.829) 
0.034 
Declinism -0.008 
(0.914) 
0.075 
Underemployed -0.023 
(0.886) 
0.157 
High Income -0.011 
(0.590) 
0.020 
Union Membership=1 0.066 
(0.686) 
0.163 
Male=1 -0.013 
(0.925) 
0.141 
Tertiary Education=1 -0.122 
(0.434) 
0.156 
Ages 18-30=1 -0.265 
(0.186) 
0.200 
Ages 65+=1 0.247 
(0.451) 
0.327 
Adjusted R2  0.088  
Note:  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
(p-value in parentheses 
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Table 3: Significant variables associated with support for Brexit 
 
Dependent Variable: Support for Brexit Unstandardized Coefficients () Standard Error 
Constant 1.850*** 
(0.000) 
0.338 
Anti-immigration=1 0.521*** 
(0.000) 
0.139 
Social Recognition 0.201** 
(0.016) 
0.083 
SSS -0.302** 
(0.025) 
0.134 
Adjusted R2 0.106  
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 (p-value in parentheses) 
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Appendix 
 
Variables Proxy Measurement Codes Expected Sign 
Social Recognition  Politicians don’t care what people 
like me think. 
1=Strongly Disagree 
4=Strongly Agree 
Positive 
Subjective Social Status 
(SSS) 
Most people say they belong to 
either the middle class or working 
class. If you had to make a choice, 
would you call yourself middle 
class or working class? 
1=working class 
2=Middle class 
3=Upper class 
Negative 
Anti-immigration=1 Do you think that too many 
immigrants have been let into this 
country or not? 
0=No, not too many 
1=Yes, too many 
Positive 
Support Redistribution Where would you place yourself 
on this scale? 
0=Government should cut taxes a lot and 
spend much less on social services 
10=Government should increase taxes a lot 
and spend much more on health and social 
services 
Negative 
Declinism How do you think the general 
economic situation in this country 
has changed over the last 12 
months? 
1= a lot worse 
5= a lot better 
Negative 
Underemployed=1 Which of these categories best 
describes what YOU mainly 
personally do at the moment 
0=working full time 
1=Working part time 
1=unemployed and actively seeking work 
Positive 
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Operationalization of all independent variables  
  
Variables Expected Sign 
High Income Negative 
Union Membership=1 Positive 
Male=1 Positive 
Tertiary Education=1 Negative 
Ages 18-30=1 Negative 
Ages 65+ =1 Positive 
 
